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INTRODUCTION 
 As in so many areas of law and politics in the United States, 
antitrust’s center is at bay.  It is besieged by a right flank that wants to 
limit antitrust even more than it has been limited over the last quarter 
century.  On the left, it faces revisionists who propose significantly 
greater enforcement. 
 
*James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Law 
School and the Wharton School. 
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One thing the two extremes share is denigration of the role of 
economics in antitrust analysis. On the right, the Supreme Court is 
increasingly revealing that fundamental economic analysis no longer 
occupies the central role that it once had.  On the left, some proposals 
by Democratic presidential contenders seem to be uninformed or 
indifferent about how their proposals will affect important participants 
in the economy. 
The antitrust laws speak of the conduct they prohibit in 
unquestionably economic terms, such as “restraint of trade,” 
“monopoly,” or lessening of “competition.” They do not embrace any 
particular economic ideology, such as the Chicago School or 
institutionalism.  Nor do they require the use of any particular 
economic model, such as perfect competition or monopolistic 
competition.  This openness gives policy makers a great deal of room, 
but it is not an invitation to economic nonsense.  Antitrust economics 
should be a tool for determining how a practice affects competition, 
which requires an assessment of who is injured by the practice, how, 
and by how much.  Economics should not be a tool for picking a 
winning interest group and then manipulating the doctrine to get that 
result. 
This paper first examines the way that the Supreme Court’s 
emergent, more conservative majority addresses issues of antitrust 
economics, focusing on its two most recent decisions at this writing.  
Then it looks at the sharply contrasting approaches of some of the 
Democrat presidential candidates for the 2020 election. 
APPLE V. PEPPER AND PASSED-ON HARM 
 In Apple, Inc. vs. Pepper both the majority opinion and the 
dissent were detached from the economic issue that has dominated 
indirect purchaser antitrust jurisprudence in the United States for forty 
years – namely, how should the law reflect that injuries from a cartel 
or monopoly overcharge are passed down through the distribution 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3508832
2020 Antitrust Economics 3 
 
chain from one purchaser to the next, although in varying degrees.1  
The questions that the Supreme Court confronted in  Illinois Brick Co. 
v. Illinois2 more than forty years earlier had to do with difficulties in 
estimating passed on damages, and the impact of alternative rules on 
deterrence of antitrust violations. 
Since that time we have made important advances in the 
measurement of indirect purchaser damages, many of which do not 
require the stage-by-stage computation of pass-on at all.3  Several 
American states4 as well as the EU and its member states have 
embraced various methodologies for addressing the problem.  Right 
now the state of EU policy on the question is far more advanced than 
in the United States.5  The EU has approached the problem as an 
empirical one of efficient and reasonably accurate damages 
measurement.  It has largely avoided the ideological baggage that has 
weighed down indirect purchaser jurisprudence in the United States.  
 
1Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S.Ct. 1514 (2019). 
2Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).  The Court held 
that its decision followed logically from Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe 
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), which had held that a defendant in 
an antitrust case could not reduce its liability by showing that the 
plaintiffs had not absorbed the entire overcharge but rather passed it 
down to its own purchasers.  On the economics and law of Illinois 
Brick, see 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. 
BLAIR & CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW ¶346 (4th ed. 
2015). 
3See Herbert Hovenkamp, Apple v. Pepper: Rationalizing Antitrust’s 
Indirect Purchaser Rule, 120 COL. L. REV. FORUM (2020), currently 
available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3394939. 
4On state antitrust indirect purchaser rules, see 14 HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶2412d (4th ed. 2019).   
5See Guidelines for National Courts on How to Estimate the Share of 
Overcharge which was Passed on to the Indirect Purchaser, 2019 O.J. 
(C 267), available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantificati
on_en.html. 
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By contrast, the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Illinois Brick 
that limiting damages to direct purchasers would improve deterrence 
has never been validated and must be counted as dubious.  It seems 
more doubtful today than it was when the Supreme Court stated it in 
1977.6  Overall, the economic case for the indirect purchaser rule is 
significantly weaker today than it was at that time.  A distinctive 
feature of the Supreme Court’s indirect purchaser rule is that it turns 
into a question of law what is rightfully a question of factual economic 
analysis. A troublesome thing about Apple vs. Pepper is not that the 
court was incorrect in its interpretation of economic developments 
subsequent to Illinois Brick, but that it did not engage them at all.  For 
all intents and purposes, Apple v. Pepper broke the link between the 
indirect purchaser rule and the economics of passed on damages. 
Why an Overcharge? 
  One technical problem with the law of purchaser damages 
actions under Illinois Brick, is the nearly universal assumption that 
damages should be measured at each stage by an overcharge and not 
for lost profits based on reduced sales.  The statute does not compel 
this result.  Section 4 of the Clayton Act merely authorizes recovery 
 
6See Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois 
Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 69, 93-94 (2007) (indirect purchaser rule strongly leads 
to underdeterrence); Andrew S. Gehring, The Power of the Purchaser: 
The Effect of Indirect Purchaser Damages Suits on Deterring Antitrust 
Violations, 5 NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 208 (2010) (inconclusive).  By 
contrast, the Government argued in an amicus brief in Apple v. Pepper 
that permitting indirect purchaser suits leads to duplicative recoveries.  
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Apple Inc. v. Pepper (2019) (No. 17-204) (“even if some or 
all of that overcharge had been passed on to consumers, allowing 
consumers to sue as well would create an evident prospect of 
duplicative recovery.”).  See also the REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION 
COMMISSION 271 (2007) (warning of duplicative recoveries if indirect 
purchaser actions were permitted). 
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for “injury … sustained” by the violation and gives a damages action 
to “any person.”7  For intermediaries in the distribution chain – that is, 
for purchasers other than the final consumer -- lost output is typically 
a more accurate measure of injury and generally does not require 
apportioning among the parties.8 
When a cartel or monopolist increases a product’s price it also 
reduces output.9  Just as the price increase, that output reduction is 
passed on through the distribution chain.  All downstream firms are 
affected by both the loss in volume and perhaps by a reduced margin, 
or markup, on their sales of the cartelized good.  In fact, the output 
reduction is a surer thing than the margin reduction.  Further, in most 
cases measuring the passed on output reduction is easier than 
measuring the passed on overcharge because it remains more uniform 
as it passes through the distribution chain. 
For example, suppose a distribution chain contains four stages:  
a manufacturer, distributors, dealers, and consumers. If a 
manufacturing cartel covering the entire market increases price, the 
distributor and the dealer will each pass on something between zero 
and more than 100% of that overcharge depending on markup policies 
and the amount of competition they face.  The phrase “more than 
100%” is apt.  If a firm uses a standard markup formula it may actually 
increase its margin as a result of the cartel.  For example, suppose a 
grocer routinely adds 30% to the wholesale price of canned vegetables.  
If the wholesale price is competitive at $2.00 it will add 60 cents.  
However, if the wholesale price is secretly cartelized to $2.50 it will 
add 75 cents.  Far from absorbing part of the overcharge, this retailer 
actually obtains higher margins under the cartel and thus passes on 
more than 100% of the overcharge.  How much it actually passes on is 
 
715 U.S.C. §15. 
8Hovenkamp, Apple vs. Pepper, supra note __. 
9See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW 
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §1.2a (6th ed. 2020), or any text in 
basic microeconomics or price theory. 
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an empirical question readily subject to expert testimony, but it will 
vary from one situation to another. 
By contrast, if this same cartel reduces output from a 
competitive level of 100 units to 80 units, the aggregate distributors’ 
sales will go from 100 units to 80 units, as will the retailers’, all the 
way down to the final consumer.  Sometimes substitution and variable 
proportions will complicate this result.  For example, the grocer might 
respond to reduced sales volume of canned beans by allocating more 
shelf space to peas or carrots. An overcharge measure will not reflect 
these substitutions because it looks only to the bean purchases.  
Likewise, if a cartel of bicycle manufacturers reduces the number of 
bicycles by 20% from the previous competitive level, their aggregate 
distributors would resell 20% fewer bicycles, as would the retailers 
below them.  However, these firms might make up their losses by 
selling more scooters or roller skates.10  By contrast, a lost profits 
measure will consider how the dealer’s behavior overall changed its 
profits, accounting for both lost margin and lost sales. 
In principle, there is no reason to think that output losses 
downstream are more difficult to measure than margin losses.  Further, 
in a wide variety of situations intermediaries are able to pass on close 
to 100% of the price increase, but they will nearly always suffer as a 
result of the output reduction.  For nearly all intermediaries, injury is 
best measured not by an overcharge but rather by lost profits – that is, 
the money that they would have made on the unmade sales.  This 
measure of harm is common in all antitrust cases alleging exclusionary 
 
10Other intermediaries might substitute in more complex ways.  For 
example, in response to a steel cartel, automakers might use fewer steel 
parts and more plastic or aluminum parts.  However, overcharge 
damages measurement will be affected in the same way. 
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practices.11  It is also common in a wide range of nonantitrust statutory 
and common law claims that involve injured business plaintiffs.12 
Lost profits are theoretically measured by the reduction in sales 
multiplied by the margin on the unmade sales.  That measure picks up 
both changes in the markup and the quantity.  This number would then 
have to be adjusted for changes in expenses, plus perhaps an offset for 
substitute products.13  In practice experts often rely on “before-and-
after” or “yardstick” models, which compare the situation in the 
violation market to some other market setting.14  The Restatement of 
Torts calls for similar measures for business injuries.15 
 
Unwarranted Exceptionalism in Antitrust Damages 
When it comes to losses by business plaintiffs, Illinois Brick is 
a piece of obsolete legal exceptionalism that came out of a period when 
many judges and scholars believed that antitrust was overdeterrent and 
that courts needed to apply the brakes to broad damage claims.  That 
is hardly the case anymore today.  Indeed, in the particular case of price 
fixing the law is significantly underdeterrent.16  Thanks to four decades 
 
11See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR 
& CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW ¶397 (4th ed. 2014). 
12E.g., Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 
(2016) (lost profits for patent infringement); Broan Mfg. v. Assoc. 
Dist. Inc, 923 F.2d 1232, 1235-1236 (6th Cir. 1991) (trademark 
infringement); Ashland Mgm’t, Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395, 624 
N.E.2d 1007 (1993) (breach of contract); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 
S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1983) (fraud). 
13 See 2A AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, BLAIR & DURRANCE id., ¶397. 
14 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
15 E.g., Rest. (2d) Torts §549 (lost profit damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation); §774A (lost profit damages for tortious 
interference with contract); §821C (public nuisance); §937 
(conversion). 
16E.g., see OECD, Cartel Sanctions Against Individuals (2003); Peter 
G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of 
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of litigating under state antitrust law and a large economic literature, it 
seems clear that it is time for the law of damages to treat plaintiffs in 
antitrust cases in the same way it treats injured parties in the more 
general run of business cases.  While measuring lost profits in all these 
cases present complexities, they are no greater in antitrust cases than 
for other types of injuries. 
Antitrust policy needs to be less categorical and more empirical 
about assessing passed-on injury from monopolistic or cartel conduct.  
Depending on the types of evidence that are available and given a wide 
variety of market facts, the optimal methodology will vary from case 
to case, as the EU Guidelines on indirect purchaser damages 
recognize.17  In most cases except those involving final consumers, lost 
profits estimates will be superior to overcharge estimates because they 
reflect the impact of the violation on both margins and volumes.  By 
contrast, the overcharge reflects only the impact on margins. 
Perversely and incorrectly, reduced volume tends to reduce an 
intermediary’s damages if it is measured only by the overcharge.  It 
can recover the overcharge only on the purchases actually made, which 
are fewer at the cartel or monopoly price.  For example, suppose that 
two different cartels produce price overcharges of $1.00 per unit in a 
market that produced 100 units at the competitive price.  One cartel 
yields an output reduction of 30 units while the other yields an output 
reduction of 40 units.  By every economic measure, the second cartel 
causes greater harm to the economy and to the affected dealer, but that 
dealer will collect fewer damages because these will be limited to the 
overcharge on 60 (100 – 40) units rather than 70 (100-30) units. 
By contrast, lost profit damages capture what is almost 
universally regarded as an element of injury in nearly all other business 
injury cases – namely, that the intermediary purchases less and thus 
 
Getting Caught, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 531 (1991); John M. Connor 
& Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime 
Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 435-42 (2012). 
17EU Guidelines, supra note __. 
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earns profits on a smaller number of sales.  The dealer in the above 
example would collect lost profit damages that reflect the output 
reduction multiplied by the lost margin on each lost sale.  This reflects 
the true injury caused by the cartel. 
The one exception to the preference for damages based on lost 
profits is the final consumer who does not resell the product at all.  For 
her, the overcharge is the best measure.  There are other, more limited 
exceptions where the overcharge is the appropriate measure.  One is 
where the price fixed good is a fixed cost to a business.  In general, 
fixed costs cannot be passed on because they do not show up in 
marginal costs.18 
For most antitrust exclusionary practices and the very large 
variety of damages cases involving torts, IP infringement, or other 
harmful activity we assess damages by permitting experts to provide 
models addressed to lost profits and evidence supporting them.  Then 
judges evaluate the models for technical sufficiency and fit under the 
Daubert standards applied under the Federal Rules of Evidence.19  
 
18See Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the 
Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 UNIV. 
PA. L. REV. 269, 280-283 (1979). 
19E.g. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 291-292 (3d Cir. 
2012) (antitrust case; accepting expert’s testimony on liability, but 
applying Daubert to reject damages testimony); LaserDynamics, Inc. 
v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Daubert 
required that patentee’s damages be limited to patented feature rather 
than market value of entire device); Lightlab Imaging, Inc. v. Axsun 
Tech., Inc. 469 Mass. 181 (2014) (rejecting expert’s lost profits 
damages report under Daubert as too speculative); System Dev. 
Integration, LLC v. Computer Sciences Corp., 886 F.Supp.2d 873 
(N.D. Il. 2012) (similar, breach of contract and fiduciary duty).  On 
these standards, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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After that, the evidence can go to the fact finder.  The same thing 
applies to indirect purchaser claims under state antitrust law.20 
Innovations in the Computation of Passed on Damages 
  As litigation subsequent to Illinois Brick has established in 
state antitrust cases, even when the overcharge measure is superior, the 
overcharge need not be computed at each stage of pass on.21  Illinois 
Brick itself assumed that it did and did not even discuss alternative 
methodologies.  Two years later William M. Landes and Richard A. 
Posner institutionalized that view in an article defending the 
decision.22   
The most common methodologies for estimating damages 
under both overcharge and lost profit theories are “before and after” 
and “yardstick.23  In a “before and after” lost profits model, the expert 
typically uses regression analysis to examine profits prior to a 
violation, after its end, or both, discounting for other factors and 
estimating what the profits would have been during the violation 
 
20 E.g., Howe v. Microsoft Corp., 656 N.W.2d 285 (Ia. 2003) (noting 
the relevance of Daubert evidentiary rules to indirect purchaser 
antitrust claim); In re South Dakota Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 657 
N.W.2d 668 (S.D. 2003) (similar); In re Processed Egg products 
Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (rejecting expert’s 
indirect purchaser damages model under Daubert); In re Flonase 
Antitrust Litig., 284 F.R.D. 207 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (approving expert’s 
methodology for assessing indirect purchasers damages under Daubert 
challenge) 
21See Hovenkamp, Apple v. Pepper, supra note __. 
22William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect 
Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An 
Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 602 
(1979). 
23See 2A AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, BLAIR & DURRANCE, ANTITRUST 
LAW, supra note __, ¶395b (before-and-after and yardstick measures 
in overcharge antitrust cases cases); ¶397e,f (before-and-after and 
yardstick measures in lost profit exclusionary practice cases). 
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period.24  In a “yardstick” model the expert compares profits in the 
violation market with profits of a similarly situated firm in a different 
market.25  Neither method is necessary, however, if there are adequate 
data.  For example, if the size of the output reduction and margins are 
known, estimation of lost profits is relatively straight forward.26 
Overcharge methodologies are similar except that the expert 
estimates the overcharge rather than lost profits.  Once again, neither 
the before-and-after nor the yardstick methodologies for computing 
damages require that pass-on be computed at each stage.27  Rather, one 
can estimate damages directly by comparing prices at the violation 
level and the plaintiffs’ level in the two markets.  For example, one 
might compare with the cartel market a different market assumed to be 
competitive, and then observe the differences in dealer prices in those 
two markets.  We would then have an estimate of the amount of 
overcharge passed on to consumers without the need to estimate how 
much of the overcharge was absorbed by distributors or other 
intermediaries.28  Experts sometimes term this the “bottom across” 
model, rather than the “top down” model that attempts to compute pass 
on at each stage.29 
In Apple vs. Pepper, neither the majority nor the dissent 
engaged any of these issues.  Indeed, both opinions appear to have 
 
24See 2A AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, BLAIR & DURRANCE, ANTITRUST 
LAW, supra, ¶397e. 
25Id., ¶397f. 
26For an example, see Formax, Inc. v. Alkar-Rapidpak-MP Equip., 
Inc., 2014 WL 3057116 (E.D.Wi. July 7, 2018) (estimating lost profit 
damages based on lost sales plus effect on margins); See ROBERT L. 
DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS (2d ed. 2005); 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Measuring Sellers’ Damages: the 
Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REV. 323 (1979). 
27For an explanation, see Hovenkamp, Apple v. Pepper, supra note __. 
28 Ibid. 
29E.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 326, 344 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001) (describing the two models). 
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abandoned the idea that Illinois Brick had anything to do with 
measuring passed on damages.  For the majority, the only thing that 
mattered was that the plaintiffs purchased directly from the alleged 
violator.   If one were to select a single buyer for damages, however, it 
would be more sensible to select the consumers, or the last purchasers 
in line, because they in most cases absorb the brunt of an overcharge 
and they are the only purchasers who are not in a position to pass 
anything on.  Only for them is the overcharge a presumptively correct 
measure of damages.    The Apple majority was correct to sustain the 
plaintiff’s action in that case, but that was a result of the pure 
happenstance that the alleged violator sold directly to the customer. 
 By contrast, the dissenters resurrected a doctrine of proximate 
cause that died with the marginalist revolution in economics, early in 
the twentieth century.30 Finally, neither the majority nor the dissenters 
ever mentioned deterrence, which is rightfully central to any 
economics-based theory of antitrust enforcement.  In sum, the Apple 
v. Pepper indirect purchaser rule both ignored the deterrence question 
and seemed indifferent to who is actually injured by a cartel or 
monopoly overcharge. 
AMERICAN EXPRESS AND RATIONAL ECONOMICS 
The Supreme Court’s American Express decision31 did not turn 
its back on economic analysis in the way that the Court did in Apple.  
Rather, it ignored fundamentals and embraced a series of economically 
incoherent principles in the guise of applying antitrust economics.  The 
majority 1) neglected the kind of transactional analysis that has 
become a hallmark of the economic approach to law; 2) put production 
complements into the same “relevant market”; 3) held that a relevant 
market must be defined in a vertical restraints case, even if the 
economic evidence supported a finding of market power based on 
more direct and generally more accurate measures; 4) completely 
 
30See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: 
NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970, Ch. 6 (Oxford, 2015). 
31Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3508832
2020 Antitrust Economics 13 
 
misunderstood the economics of free riding, which in the context of 
vertical restraints is a Chicago School invention; in this case, the 
defendant’s policies clearly made free riding impossible; and 5) lost 
sight of the fact that coherent economic analysis of any antitrust issue 
requires assessment of marginal rather than total effects. 
Balancing Harms and Benefits on Two-Sided Markets 
The Supreme Court majority’s analysis of two-sided platforms 
got off on the wrong track when it assumed that harms on one side, in 
the form of increased merchant prices, would be offset by benefits on 
the other, cardholder side.32  For some platform-related queries this is 
true.  For example, measuring a platform’s costs or revenues requires 
looking at both sides.  Over-the-air television or computer search 
engines that are free to users are not engaged in predatory pricing.  
They obtain their revenues from advertisers, which are the other side 
of the platform.  Assessing a predation claim based on below cost 
pricing requires looking at both sides. 
But this harm/benefit balance does not occur in every situation.  
Had the Court performed the kind of transactional analysis that Ronald 
Coase urged and that has become a hallmark of law and economics, it 
would have seen that the assumption of harms to merchants and 
offsetting benefits to cardholders did not apply in this case.  In The 
Nature of the Firm, for example, Coase would identify a firm’s 
boundaries by looking at each transaction that the firm made, as 
opposed to activities it conducted inside the firm and for which no 
market transaction was necessary.33  If the Court had examined each 
relevant transaction in AmEx, it would have seen that the anti-steering 
rules harmed both sides.34 
 
32AmEx, 138 S.Ct. at 2287-2288. 
33 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
34 See Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. (2020) 
(forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3219396. 
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To illustrate, suppose that a $1000 purchase incurred a 3% 
($30) merchant fee on the AmEx card, but a 2% ($20) fee on a 
competing card such as Visa.  This difference creates $10 worth of 
bargaining room in which both parties can make a profit.  That is, the 
merchant’s willingness-to-pay might be greater than the customer’s 
willingness-to-accept.35  For example, the merchant might offer the 
customer a $5 discount for using the cheaper card.  If the incremental 
perks from using an AmEx card rather than a different card were worth 
less than $5 to the customer it would accept that deal, and both parties 
would be better off.  The merchant would pay a lower transaction fee 
and a customer who accepted the offer would be getting a discount that 
was worth more to her than any extra benefit the AmEx card might 
offer.  By contrast, if she valued the AmEx perks by more than $5, she 
would not accept the offer.36 
 However, the anti-steering rule prevented this transaction 
from occurring.  Far from harming one side while benefitting the other, 
the anti-steering rule harmed both the merchant and the cardholder 
who was willing to make the deal.  It also harmed Visa, the card issuer 
who was unable to make the transaction even though its price was 
lower and it would have been the customer’s first choice in an 
unrestrained market.  It did benefit AmEx – but these were not network 
benefits that needed to be assessed against losses elsewhere on the 
same platform.  They were simply the benefits that accrued from being 
able to charge a price that was higher than the added value of any 
provided customer services without losing a sale.37  This number had 
nothing to do with the existence of a two-sided platform. 
 
35E.g., Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 4 (1982). 
36See Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: the 
American Express Case, 2019 COL. BUS. L. REV. 35 (2018). 
37 That is, looking at the previous example, the fact that the customer 
would prefer the offer of a $5 discount meant that she valued use of 
the AmEx card by less than $5, while AmEx’s excess merchant fee 
over the Visa card was $10. 
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Market Definition and Extra-Market Effects 
The AmEx Court also held that both sides of a platform needed 
to be placed into the same “relevant market,” in violation of one of the 
most cardinal principles of economics since the time of Alfred 
Marshall or even Augustin Cournot – namely, that markets consist of 
close substitutes that can steal sales from one another, such that 
competition forces them to move toward the same price.38 
This meaning of the term “market” is essential, not merely to 
antitrust analysis, but to virtually all of economics.  A “market” defines 
the group of firms that can profit from collusion,39 the scope of sales 
that give meaning to the term “monopolist,”40 the range of goods and 
services that people might regard as good substitutes for one another; 
the range of producers that a firm regards as its competitors for the 
purposes of deciding whether or not to enter, how much to produce, or 
what price to charge.41  For example, the Merger Guidelines used by 
 
38 E.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 384  (1890) 
[Book Five, Ch. 1] (“The more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger 
is the tendency for the same price to be paid for the same thing at the 
same time in all parts of the market”; and id. at 385: “(the market is 
“the whole of any region in which buyers and sellers are in such free 
intercourse with one another that the prices of the same goods tend to 
equality easily and quickly.”  Marshall was translating AUGUSTIN A. 
COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
THEORY OF WEALTH, ch. 14 (1838). 
39See, e.g., Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical Guide 
to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1031 (2008). 
40Id., and see, e.g., U.S. DOJ and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
§4.1.1 (2010), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-
merger-guidelines-08192010 (using “hypothetical monopolist” test for 
market definition). 
41Justice Breyer’s dissent found the majority’s new approach to market 
definition completely unjustified: 
 
Missing from the majority's analysis is any explanation as 
to why, given the purposes that market definition serves in 
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the antitrust Agencies define markets by identifying the range of goods 
that are close substitutes.42 
Conceptually, the idea of a relevant market comes from partial 
equilibrium analysis in microeconomics, a tool that dates to the time 
of Alfred Marshall to evaluate market changes that affect the producers 
of similar goods in a common and observable way.43  Defining a 
market in this fashion involves a working assumption that output and 
pricing of the goods inside the market influence one another strongly, 
while there are no effects between goods inside and goods outside the 
market. 
Empirically of course this is not true.  Even well defined 
markets have porous boundaries.  The goods inside are affected by 
imperfect substitutes outside, as well as by complements.44  Antitrust 
 
antitrust law, the fact that a credit-card firm can be said to 
operate a “two-sided transaction platform” means that its 
merchant-related and shopper-related services should be 
combined into a single market. 
AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2297-2298 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
42HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note __, §4 (“Market 
definition focuses solely on demand substitution factors, i.e., on 
customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away from one product 
to another in response to a price increase or a corresponding non-price 
change such as a reduction in product quality or service.”) 
43On the development in Alfred Marshall, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
THE OPENING IF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1970: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT 31-33 (2015). 
44Marshall himself understood this. See ALFRED MARSHALL, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS xiv ([1890], 8th ed. 1949), defending the 
idea that economic analysis should examine a part of the market 
consisting of a single “commodity” over a restricted time period, 
assuming that changes within the observed market had no effect on 
things outside: 
The forces to be dealt with are however so numerous, that it is 
best to take a few at a time; and to work out a number of partial 
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writers as well as economists have recognized this from the beginning, 
and in a number of ways.  Nevertheless, by grouping close substitutes 
in this way and constructing a wall between these and more distant 
products, courts have been able to draw important conclusions about 
the existence of market power.  As a result, this method of assessing 
power has become all but conventional in antitrust analysis, although 
recently tools have been developed that are more accurate and that 
make market definition approaches unnecessary in many 
circumstances.45 
When transactions or other events outside the defined market 
have a measurable impact on transactions inside the market, they must 
be accounted for.  Over the years antitrust litigation has confronted 
several approaches to the question of so-called “extramarket” effects.  
One of the most theoretical is the theory of “second best,” which relies 
on general equilibrium analysis to consider the impact that a practice 
might have on entities or events outside of the relevant market.46  For 
example, under second best theory the data might show a welfare 
improvement in a defined market, but there might be significant “out 
of market” effects that serve to make things worse off as a whole.  The 
 
solutions as auxiliaries to our main study. Thus we begin by 
isolating the primary relations of supply, demand and price in 
regard to a particular commodity. We reduce to inaction all 
other forces by the phrase “other things being equal”: we do 
not suppose that they are inert, but for the time we ignore their 
activity. This scientific device is a great deal older than science: 
it is the method by which, consciously or unconsciously, 
sensible men have dealt from time immemorial with every 
difficult problem of ordinary life. 
On the antitrust relevant market as a tool of partial equilibrium 
analysis, see Gregory Werden, The Relevant Market: Possible and 
Productive, ANTITRUST L.J. ONLINE (2014).  On the fundamentals, see 
R. K. MANDAL, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 312-314 (2007). 
45See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
46See, e.g., Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market 
Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-
Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849 (2000). 
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consensus today is that the general theory of second best has little 
application to antitrust analysis, despite some heroic attempts to make 
it so.47 
Another prominent use of partial equilibrium analysis is Oliver 
Williamson’s well known welfare tradeoff model, which assumed a 
single but unspecified market in which the welfare effects of reduced 
competition and increased efficiency would be felt.48  In using it, 
Williamson acknowledged: 
Our partial equilibrium analysis suffers from a defect common 
to all partial equilibrium constructions. By isolating one sector 
from the rest of the economy it fails to examine interactions 
between sectors.49 
 
 Judicial examination of out of market effects in merger analysis 
has also occurred.  For example, a merger of multimarket firms might 
reduce competition in one market but increase it in another.50  One 
legal limitation is that §7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers that 
injure competition “in any line of commerce” and in any “section of 
 
47 For one attempt, see Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best theory and 
the Standard Analysis of Monopoly rent Seeking: A Generalizable 
Critique, A “Sociological” Account, and some Illustrative Stories, 78 
IOWA L. REV. 327 (1993). 
48Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: the 
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).  Williamson 
expanded on the use of partial equilibrium analysis in antitrust and its 
assumptions in Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust 
Defense Revisited, 125 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 699 (1978). 
49Williamson, Economies, supra, 58 AM. ECON. REV. at 23. 
50E.g., United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 
(1963) (merger presumably harmed competition in market dominated 
by small banks and smaller loans, but would have improved 
competition in market for larger loans).  See also United States v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) 
(anticompetitive consequences in one region could not be offset 
against lower prices and reduced freight charges in another region).  
See Daniel A. Crane, Balancing Effects Across Markets, 80 
ANTITRUST L.J. 397 (2015). 
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the country.”51 Those statements do not appear to permit trading harms 
in one market against gains in a different market.52  If a merger injures 
competition “in any line of commerce,” then under the statute it 
literally does not matter if it also produces benefits somewhere else.  
The 2010 Merger Guidelines take this position by requiring a showing 
that a merger “"is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant 
market."53 
 
 Yet another example of extramarket effects is the theory of 
monopoly “leveraging,” or the idea that a firm can use its power in one 
market to obtain an advantage in a second market.54  The theory had a 
life of several decades, although it was not frequently accepted by 
courts.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Spectrum Sports very likely 
put an end to it as a theory of action by requiring that there be a 
dangerous probability of success of monopoly in the second market.  
That effectively turned leveraging into part of the law of attempt to 
monopolize.55  However, Spectrum Sports did not dispose of the basic 
economic theory that a firm could use its power in one market to obtain 
 
5115 U.S.C. § 18 (condemning mergers where “where in any line 
of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of 
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly”). 
52See 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶972 (4th ed. 2016). 
53Antitrust Division, Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §10 (2010), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010. 
54See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) 
(accepting the theory); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 
F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979) (accepting the theory but finding it 
inapplicable); Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. V. British Airways PLC, 
257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001) (lengthy discussion but rejecting it on the 
facts of this case); Intergraph corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (largely rejecting the theory). 
55Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993); see also 
Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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advantages or even to monopolize a second market.56  For example, 
while subsequent decisions such as Microsoft never spoke of 
leveraging, the theory of action was that a firm used power in one 
market (the Windows operating system) in order to exclude or injure 
competition in a different but complementary market (browsers).57 
 
 A related and quite frequent use of effects outside a primary 
market is the law of tying arrangements.  The tying and tied products 
in tying cases are usually complements, such as salt-injecting 
machines and salt, printers and ink cartridges, cameras and film, or 
computer operating systems and browsers or other applications.  The 
theory is typically that a firm has significant market power in a primary 
market, and then uses tying to distort competition in the second, or 
complementary, market.  In such cases we do not define a single 
market for the tying and tied products, which would be nonsensical.  
Rather, courts are asked to determine whether the defendant’s power 
in one market is sufficient to cause anticompetitive distortions in the 
second market, with monopoly being the most extreme one, and then 
whether it has actually done so.58   For example, a firm with a dominant 
share in a computer operating system market might be able to tie an 
internet browser and thereby foreclose, or exclude, rivals in the 
browser market.59 
 
 Analytically related to tying is vertical mergers, which unite 
firms that stand in a supplier/buyer relationship, such as a 
manufacturer and one of its parts suppliers60 or an internet or cable 
 
56See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶652 (4th ed. 2015). 
57United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).  The district court did speak of leveraging 
power from the operating system market to the browser market.  
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 30, 46 (D.D.C. 2000). 
58See 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶¶1709, 1729 (4th ed. 2018). 
59United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65–67 (D.C.Cir.), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001) (noting that Microsoft’s tie of its 
Windows OS and Internet Explorer browser virtually ousted rival 
browser Netscape from the market). 
60E.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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services provider and a digital programmer.61  In general, 
condemnation requires a showing that the merger tends to exclude 
rivals in the secondary market or else increase their costs.  As with 
tying, we do not define a single market for both the upstream and 
downstream good and it would not be enlightening to do so.  The 
Agencies’ 2020 Draft Guidelines for vertical merger enforcement 
adhere to this view, although they also call for more direct approaches 
that do not require a market definition at all.62 
 
 In sum, antitrust has been dealing with effects that occur 
outside the boundaries of a defined relevant market for a long time and 
addressing such questions is hardly exceptionsl.  Concededly, we do it 
imperfectly.  Nevertheless, it is hardly news that offsetting pressures 
from a complementary good might affect the strength of an inference 
of market power.  For example, the high price of fuel might limit the 
market power of automobile makers, or high compensation for Uber 
drivers might limit ridership. 
But defining a relevant market for “automobiles/gasoline” or 
for “drivers/passengers” will not contribute one whit to our 
understanding of the situation, and will only serve to throw us off 
track.  Defining the market the way the Court did in AmEx simply made 
the market definition incoherent.  It promises to expose the judicial 
system to thousands of dollars in wasted resources dealing with such 
questions as whether Uber drivers and Uber passengers, or physicians 
and patients, or search engine users and advertisers, are in the same 
relevant market.  Further, it does this in perverse ways that contributes 
nothing of value, and undermines rather than strengthens the analysis 
of power.  For example, if we began with a group of Uber drivers in 
St. Paul, the knowledge that there are 1000 additional drivers in nearby 
 
61E.g., United States v. AT&T, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
62 U.S. Dept. of Justice and FTC, Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines §5a 
(Jan. 10, 2020), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/15617
15/p810034verticalmergerguidelinesdraft.pdf (stating that the 
Agencies may rely on merger simulation methods that “need not rely 
on market definition”). 
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Minneapolis would serve to weaken the inference of their power.  By 
contrast, the knowledge that there were 1000 additional passengers in 
Minneapolis would serve to strengthen it.  Putting all in the same 
market would require us to treat these two groups in the same way, 
even though their effects are precisely the opposite.  This is worse than 
useless. 
But the main point is that if one looks at the impact of the anti-
steering rule there were no losses on the merchant side to be traded 
against gains on the cardholder side.  There were only losses on both 
sides. 
Assessing Power on Two-Sided Platforms 
How should power be assessed for antitrust purposes in 
markets for two-side platforms such as AmEx?   The inquiry needs to 
be manageable even though it can be quite technical.  Further, the 
existence of different effects on the two sides of a digital platform, 
including feedback effects, can complicate the assessment.  It is worth 
noting that we have always tolerated a significant amount of 
inaccuracy in market definition methodologies.  Insistence on 
precision can become a costly rule of nonliability to the extent it 
produces too many false negatives.  In this case the danger of false 
negatives must certainly be counted as greater than the danger of false 
positives. Further, traditional methodologies that require 
determination of a relevant market, as the Supreme Court required in 
this case,63 are predictably inaccurate, particularly in differentiated 
markets. 
Traditional methods of estimating power on the basis of market 
share of a defined relevant market are termed “indirect.”  As courts use 
them they do not really measure market power at all, but rather rely on 
an intuitive link between market share and market power.  In fact, 
measuring power from share requires additional information about the 
elasticity of demand of the market in which the firm sells, plus the 
 
63 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
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elasticity of supply of competing or fringe firms.64  Because most 
litigation does not produce these numbers and judges rarely discuss 
them in any technical way, our inferences of power from market share 
alone are necessarily crude. 
Both elasticity numbers are relevant, however, and cannot be 
ignored.  Further, many decisions discuss them, although almost 
always by using different terminology.  For example, when a court 
doubts that a market is well defined because there seem to be good 
substitutes from outside the proposed market, it is talking about the 
market’s elasticity of demand.  This was an issue in the Whole Foods 
merger case, where the court struggled mightily with the question 
whether there was a well-defined market for “premium natural and 
organic supermarkets” (PNOS), or whether more traditional grocers 
should also be included.65  To the extent customers were sensitive to 
price and substituted back and forth between PNOS and traditional 
markets in response to price changes, the justification for defining such 
a market is weaker. 
When a court discusses low barriers to entry or mobility, it is 
speaking about elasticity of supply.  For example, in Rebel Oil the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that self-service gasoline was not an 
appropriate relevant market for evaluating a predatory pricing claim.  
 
64 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust 
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 944-945 (1981). 
65FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 f.3d 1028, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (concluding that the narrower market was factually justified).  
Similar situations include Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. 
Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2009) (relevant market for 
medical delivery could not be limited to patients who had private 
insurance); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098 
(N.D.Cal. 2004) (disagreeing with government that relevant market 
should be limited to “high function” financial management software).  
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While customer might have strong preferences for self-service vs. full-
service gas, suppliers could readily switch between the two.66 
Drawing inferences of power from market share when the firms 
operate on two-sided platforms presents its own problems.67  Most 
such markets are differentiated, making market share estimates less 
reliable.  When differentiated products are placed into the same 
market, as is typical, the result is to understate market power because 
it treats the firms as if they were perfect competitors.  Of course, not 
all platforms are differentiated to the same degree.  For example, many 
people may regard Uber and Lyft as closely similar to one another, 
making price competition particularly important.  People can 
download apps for both companies at no charge, and readily compare 
prices before settling on a driver. 68  While some users may have 
preferences, for the most part they appear to operate as close 
competitors in those towns where both are available. 
Clearly there is no basis, however, for putting drivers and riders 
into the same “market.”  It adds nothing to the analysis.  Uber’s share 
could be measured either by ridership, the most intuitively correct 
measure for most cases, and ridership would be compared with other 
market candidates, including Lyft and perhaps traditional cab drivers.  
For some purposes, particularly those involving restraints on drivers, 
the number of drivers might also be used.  For example, if Uber should 
 
66E.g., Rebel Oil co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (low entry barriers into alleged market for self-serve 
gasoline undermined antitrust claim); Tops Markets, Inc. v. Quality 
Markets, Inc., 142 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998) (low entry barriers 
precluded claim that defendant monopolized market for grocery store 
sites). 
67See Jens-Uwe Franck & Martin Peitz, Market Definition and Market 
Power in the Platform Economy  §3.6 (CERRE, 2019), available at 
https://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/2019_cerre_market_definition_
market_power_platform_economy.pdf. . 
68See https://www.ridester.com/uber-vs-lyft/ (comparing prices and 
features of Uber and Lyft). 
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impose exclusive dealing on its drivers by forbidding them from 
driving for Lyft or a traditional taxicab company, the challenged 
restraint would be in the market for drivers and the questions would 
properly focus on Uber’s ability to suppress driver earnings or limit 
the opportunities of competitors to acquire sufficient drivers.  The 
number and availability of riders could certainly be relevant.  For 
example, the scarcity of riders might make an exclusive agreement 
more damaging to a rival, while an ample supply of riders would make 
it less so.  But placing riders and drivers into the same “relevant 
market” would not be a sensible way to address this question.  Indeed, 
it would make coherent analysis of the problem impossible. 
By contrast to market share measures, “direct” measures of 
market power need not require definition of a relevant market at all.69  
In addition to their other advantages, two things point in favor of more 
direct measurement when the market in question is a two-sided 
platform.  One is that the markets are nearly all digital and as a result 
they preserve fairly complete records of transactions.  This means that 
there are typically useful data about prices, quantities, and shifts in 
response to changes. One of the most serious limitations on the use of 
direct measurement of power is inadequacy of data. Second, the 
markets are differentiated, some significantly so.  This tends to make 
market share methodologies unreliable, giving more direct measures a 
comparative advantage. 
Traditional market definition approaches in product 
differentiated markets are always wrong. Putting differentiated 
products into separate markets exaggerates power because it treats the 
two goods as if they do not compete with each other at all.  By contrast, 
putting them into the same market treats them as if they were perfect 
competitors.  For example, the so-called “Cellophane fallacy,” named 
after a monopolization case involving that product, occurs when the 
Court places highly differentiated products into the same market and 
 
69Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 
(2010). 
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then simply computes market share by adding up their output on the 
premise that these diverse goods are perfect competitors.70 On the 
other hand, putting two products such as cellophane and wax paper 
into separate markets treats them as if they do not compete at all – a 
conclusion that is equally wrong.  For many goods cellophane and wax 
paper may be viable alternative wrapping materials.  Market definition 
approaches to the assessment of market power are necessarily binary, 
which means that a particular group of sales must be counted as either 
inside or outside of the relevant market, but not something in between.  
By contrast, demand responses to changes in costs or prices can be 
observed and metered as finely as the data permit.  As a result, if the 
data are available they give a much more accurate assessment of a 
firm’s market power. 
In the AmEx case, direct measures indicated that AmEx had 
significant power.71  First, as the government showed, AmEx was able 
to increase its price repeatedly without losing sales.  Taken in isolation 
that fact is insufficient, because it says nothing about what is occurring 
on the other side of the platform.  In combination with other 
information, however, it could be decisive.  For example, were the 
merchant price increases matched by simultaneously increased perks 
to customers? Or were there other offsetting cost increases that 
justified the price increases?  If these cost increases were common to 
the industry, then price increases would not necessarily result in a loss 
of share.  On the other hand, if merchant price increases were not 
accompanied by changes on the cardholder side of the market, this 
suggests that AmEx was seeking out its profit maximizing price by 
raising prices until too many merchants defected.72  Even with the anti-
steering rule in place, Amex would not have infinite power to increase 
 
70See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 
(1956), criticized in 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶534 (4th ed. 2014). 
71See Michael Katz and Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and 
Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L. J. 2142 (2018). 
72See Franck & Peitz, Market Definition, supra note __, §3.6.1,  p. 63. 
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merchant fees.  Although under an anti-steering rule AmEx customers 
would be indifferent to higher merchant fees, merchants would not be.  
At some point the merchants’ costs to carry the AmEx card would 
become so high that the merchants themselves would drop it, foregoing 
whatever prestige or convenience value the card offered.  
To state this a little differently, as American Express increased 
its merchant fees beyond the fees charged by competing cards, the 
merchants’ incentive to steer also increased.  The anti-steering rule 
forbad this practice, putting the merchants to the choice of either 
paying AmEx’s higher fees or else dropping the card.  To the extent 
they did the former, it showed AmEx’s power.  Further, that number 
could be assessed by measuring the rate of merchant defection in 
response to a merchant fee increase. 
Inferring Power from Conduct 
Assessing market power in antitrust cases is not an abstract 
proposition.  It needs to be assessed differently for different purposes.  
In the AmEx case the antitrust question was a limited one: was the no-
steering rule anticompetitive? That rule reduced customer substitution 
by making card users indifferent to which card they were using, 
notwithstanding higher merchant costs for the AmEx card. 
Power can often be inferred from the conduct itself.  A good 
example of this is naked price fixing.  We can infer power from 
conduct in cases of naked price fixing because market power is an 
essential ingredient in making price fixing profitable.  Given its 
significant risks, firms would not do it unless they believed that they 
could profit from it.  To be sure, the firms might be mistaken, believing 
that they had power when in fact they did not.  But setting that aside, 
the existence of naked price fixing indicates power.  Indeed, we 
generally define a naked restraint as one that depends on market power 
for its success.73  We need not be too concerned about those cases in 
 
73See 11 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW  ¶1906 (4th ed. 2018). 
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which the putative cartel overestimates its power because in the case 
of naked collusion overdeterrence is not much of a problem. 
This makes it important to consider the question of harms and 
benefits in AmEx.  As noted previously, the AmEx majority simply 
assumed that the no-steering rule caused harm to merchants for the 
benefit of cardholders.  However, the anti-steering rule actually 
harmed both merchants and all those card holders who were affected 
– namely, that who would have switched absent the rule.74  In the 
absence of power AmEx could not pull off such a restraint. 
The anti-steering rule made it impossible for a merchant to 
steer people to a less costly card with respect to those transactions 
where a card holder would be inclined to accept the invitation to steer.  
In a competitive market the effect of the rule would be that the 
merchant would drop that card. But the merchants who carried AmEx 
felt that they needed the AmEx card notwithstanding its higher costs.  
How much they needed it presents a question of degree, but the fact 
that AmEx repeatedly increased merchant prices without significant 
defections indicates power. 
If the data permit, another way to infer power from the conduct 
itself is to examine fees and perks with and without a no steering rule.  
Here, the relevant question is, did AmEx’s higher merchant acceptance 
fees reflect nothing more than the cost of delivering more valuable 
cardholder benefits that were fully justified by consumer demand?  Or 
were they higher fees that would not be justified by consumer demand 
if the consumers were able to make their demand known? For example, 
a BMW might cost more than an equivalently sized Toyota Corolla, 
but that is not necessarily an indicator of great power; the proportion 
of price to costs might be identical for the two vehicles.  However, if 
merchant fees came down when the anti-steering rule was removed, 
ceteris paribus that would indicate that a sufficient number of 
 
74See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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customers preferred the lower prices to the perks.  That would indicate 
that the anti-steering rule is an exercise of market power. 
Market Power in Vertical Cases 
The AmEx Court held – without citing any economic evidence 
or literature – that a relevant market must be established in a vertical 
case even if alternative methods of estimating power were available.  
The Court’s complete statement on this issue, including both analysis 
and conclusion, is contained in this footnote: 
 
The plaintiffs argue that we need not define the relevant 
market in this case because they have offered actual evidence 
of adverse effects on competition-- namely, increased 
merchant fees. We disagree. The cases that the plaintiffs cite 
for this proposition evaluated whether horizontal restraints had 
an adverse effect on competition .... Given that horizontal 
restraints involve agreements between competitors not to 
compete in some way, this Court concluded that it did not need 
precisely define the relevant market to conclude that these 
agreements were anticompetitive .... But vertical restraints are 
different. Vertical restraints often pose no risk to competition 
unless the entity imposing them has market power, which 
cannot be evaluated unless the Court first defines the relevant 
market.75 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer was clearly flummoxed by this statement 
– as if the majority did not understand that defining a relevant market 
and direct measurement are alternative mechanisms for assessing 
market power.76 
Over the last several decades the usefulness and robustness of 
“direct” and more econometric measures of power that do not depend 
 
75AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7. 
76Id. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“One critical point that the 
majority's argument ignores is that proof of actual adverse effects on 
competition is, a fortiori, proof of market power.”). 
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on a market definition have become much more practical and 
prominent.77 They are widely used to evaluate horizontal mergers 
threatening anticompetitive unilateral effects.78  The recently issued 
draft vertical merger guidelines indicate the same approach for 
analyzing the unilateral anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers.79 
Direct measures of firm responses to changes in demand or cost 
require transaction information, so one limitation on their use is the 
availability of data.  But in the AmEx case all of the relevant credit card 
transactions were digitized.  Obtaining the data should not pose a 
significant problem.  In any event, direct measures of power are very 
likely superior to inferences drawn from market share, particularly 
where the products in question are differentiated, as they were in 
AmEx.80 
Fortunately, there are ways to limit the damage resulting from 
the Court’s requirement of a market definition in a vertical case.  Direct 
methodologies can usually be translated into a conclusion about 
market boundaries.  After all, a market is a grouping of sales for which 
 
77See discussion supra, text at notes __; and the methodologies 
described in 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. 
SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶515-521 (4th ed. 2014); Louis Kaplow, 
Why (Ever) Define Markets, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (2010) (discussing 
relative strengths and methodologies). 
78Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal 
Merger: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. 
THEORETICAL ECON. 1 (2010).  See also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶913a (4th ed. 2017) 
(discussing case law and other literature). 
79U.S. Dept. of Justice and FTC, Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines 
(Jan. 10, 2020), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/15617
15/p810034verticalmergerguidelinesdraft.pdf (§5a, noting that the 
Agencies may use merger simulation models to evaluate unilateral 
effects from vertical mergers that “need not rely on market 
definition”). 
80See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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the firm(s) that control them could sustainably exact a non-cost-
justified price increase above the competitive level.  Delineating a 
relevant market is one way of producing an answer to this question, 
although indirectly from inferences about market share.  However, 
more direct measures can answer the same question as well, through 
such devices as estimating the residual elasticity of demand that faces 
the firm.  A “residual” elasticity is an estimate of the demand facing 
an individual firm after the demand for all of its competitors’ goods 
has been excluded.81 
In that case, however, direct measure not only assesses the 
firm’s power, but can also define the boundary of a relevant market.  
For example, if price change and response data show that a firm has 
enough power to charge a monopoly price for product Alpha, we can 
express that conclusion directly by saying that the maker of Alpha has 
a certain amount of power because the residual elasticity of demand it 
faces is relatively low.  Alternatively, we can say that the firm’s profit-
maximizing price is at a monopoly level in relation to its costs.  
However, we can also express that conclusion by saying that product 
Alpha constitutes a relevant market if the difference between cost and 
price is sufficiently large. 
Economic experts assessing unilateral effects merger cases do 
a version of this, which courts have come to recognize, even though 
they generally go through the formality of requiring a market 
definition as well.  On the one hand, the methodologies that are used 
to assess the price effects of a particular merger in a product 
 
81AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note __ at ¶521; Kaplow, Why 
(Ever), supra note __; MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON 
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 100-14 (2006); Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy 
F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring 
Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1992); Jonathan B. Baker & 
Timothy F. Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing 
a Single Firm, 6 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 283 (1988) .  For good historical 
perspective, see Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market 
Delineation, 76 MARQUETTE L. REV. 123 (1992). 
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differentiated market do not require a market definition.  On the other 
hand, once this methodology is used to predict a price increase of the 
necessary magnitude, we can say that the grouping of sales in question 
constitutes a relevant market. 
Although the economist need not reach this additional 
conclusion about the boundaries of a relevant market in order to predict 
the price effects of the merger, he or she may have to do it in order to 
satisfy the legal requirement that the price increase occur in some “line 
of commerce” and “section of the country,” as §7 of the Clayton Act 
requires.82  In its Brown Shoe decision the Supreme Court equated 
“line of commerce” with a product market and “section of the country” 
with a geographic market.83  Another way of stating this proposition is 
that a conclusion about market power based on an econometric 
measure such as residual elasticity becomes evidence of the 
proposition that the grouping of sales whose residual elasticity is low 
is a relevant market. 
The court in United States v. H & R Block, a merger challenge, 
was particularly candid about this approach: 
“As a matter of applied economics, evaluation of unilateral 
effects does not require a market definition in the traditional 
sense at all.”84 This is so because unilateral effects analysis 
focuses on measuring a firm's market power directly by 
“estimating the change in residual demand facing the post-
 
8215 U.S.C. § 18 (condemning a merger “where in any line of 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the 
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”). 
83 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).  See 
Herbert Hovenkamp and Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market 
Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2015 (2018). 
84Quoting 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶ 913a, at 66 (4th ed. 2016) 
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merger firm. ‘Residual demand’ refers to the demand for a 
firm's goods after the output of all other competing firms has 
been taken into account.”  If market power itself can be directly 
measured or estimated reliably, then in theory market 
definition is superfluous, at least as a matter of economics, 
because “[i]dentifying a market and computing market shares 
provide an indirect means for measuring market power.”85 The 
2010 revisions to the Merger Guidelines also appear to reflect 
this understanding. See Merger Guidelines § 4 (“The Agencies' 
analysis need not start with market definition. Some of the 
analytical tools used by the Agencies to assess competitive 
effects do not rely on market definition, although evaluation of 
competitive alternatives available to customers is always 
necessary at some point in the analysis.”). As a legal matter, 
however, a market definition may be required by Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324 
(“[D]etermination of the relevant market is a necessary 
predicate to a finding of a violation of the Clayton Act because 
the threatened monopoly must be one which will substantially 
lessen competition ‘within the area of effective competition.’ 
Substantiality can be determined only in terms of the market 
affected. The ‘area of effective competition’ must be 
determined by reference to a product market (the ‘line of 
commerce’) and a geographic market (the ‘section of the 
country’); see also Heinz, 246 F.3d at 719 n. 17 (“Courts 
interpret ‘line of commerce’ [in the language of the Clayton 
Act] as synonymous with the relevant product market.”). The 
Court is not aware of any modern Section 7 case in which the 
court dispensed with the requirement to define a relevant 
product market….86 
 
85Quoting 2B Id. ¶ 532a at 242–43; and ¶ 521c. 
86United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F.Supp.2d 36, 84-85 n. 35 
(D.D.C. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 
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Thus in a vertical case, as in a merger case, a court could consider 
direct evidence of market power, which was strong in AmEx, but 
express that conclusion in terms of a relevant market. 
 
 As noted above, the Agencies state in the 2020 Draft Vertical 
Merger Guidelines that they will employ methodologies that “need not 
rely on market definition.”87  That conclusion seems to contradict the 
Supreme Court’s statement in AmEx that a market definition is 
required in a vertical case.88  To be sure, AmEx involved a vertical 
restraint rather than a vertical merger.  It is hard to see, however, why 
vertical restraints and vertical mergers should be treated any 
differently on this point.  In any event, the Agencies may already be 
signaling that they intend not to qualify the Supreme Court’s indication 
that a relevant market must be defined in a vertical case. 
 
The Meaning of Free Riding 
The AmEx majority also misunderstood how free riding works.  
It suggested that rival card issuers might be taking a free ride on 
AmEx’s business model, which relied on high merchant fees with high 
offsetting rewards to customers.89  The Court apparently believed that 
a Visa card holder could free ride on AmEx’s benefits simply by 
acquiring a Visa card and keeping it in his pocket.  What the Court 
overlooked is that one can obtain the AmEx rewards only by actually 
using the AmEx card, and the amount of the award is tied to the amount 
of the AmEx card transaction.90 
Justice Breyer’s dissent noted the error: “plainly investments 
tied to card use … are not subject to free-riding….”91    For example, 
free riding occurs when one dealer is able to profit from a second 
 
87Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, supra note __.  
88See discussion supra, text at notes __, quoting AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 
2285 n.7 
89AmEx, 138 S.Ct. at 2290. 
90Cf. Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 
593, 675 (7th Cir. 1996) (when payments are made in proportion to 
how services are delivered the “ride is not free”). 
91AmEx, 138 S.Ct. 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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dealer’s promotional services because these services cannot be directly 
tied to the purchase of the product.92  It plainly has no application in a 
case such as AmEx, where card user benefits were specifically tied to 
actual purchases with the AmEx card.  A card holder who wants the 
additional travel miles that American Express promises cannot obtain 
them simply by owning an AmEx card; she must actually use the card 
to purchase the airline ticket. 
The economics of free riding has been used to champion 
relaxation of antitrust rules respecting vertical restraints such as resale 
price maintenance, and with good results.  But an essential ingredient 
in those situations is an investment whose returns can be captured by 
someone else.  The classic example is point-of-sale retailer services 
that must be provided prior to sale and can be priced only through the 
product.  That enables a competitor to steal the sale by inducing 
customers to obtain the services from the full service dealer, but then 
to purchase the product at a lower price from the free rider.93 Resale 
price maintenance can address this problem by requiring both dealers 
to charge the same minimum price.  As a result, the customer has no 
incentive to switch. When the benefits can be obtained only through 
purchase of the product, however, there is no opportunity for free 
riding. 
Marginal vs. Total Effects 
Competition occurs at the margin.  Marginalism is the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century’s most important contribution 
to economic analysis.94  Measuring effects at the margin means that 
one cannot simply look at totals or averages.  Rather, the question is 
how much a particular act changes a particular outcome.  Speaking 
 
92 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW 
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §11.3 (6th ed. 2020). 
93See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 
3 J. L. & ECON. 86 (1960). 
94For a history, focusing on the United States, see HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note __, Chs. 1 & 2. 
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about the importance of marginal analysis in law, Frank Easterbrook 
observed that “The Court's efforts to influence future conduct are 
doomed unless it appreciates how incentives work…. [P]eople look at 
marginal rather than average effects.” 95 Marginalism in economics is 
not one of those things that divides the political left and the right.  It 
has become fundamental to economic analysis of all kinds.  
Marginalism in economics enables modern price theory and industrial 
organization, cost-benefit analysis, and economic analysis of social 
cost and externalities. 
Antitrust’s rule of reason is in fact a stylized variation of cost-
benefit analysis, with the important qualifier that the fact finder must 
determine not merely whether a practice reduces welfare, but whether 
it does so by limiting competition.  In a rule of reason antitrust case 
such as NCAA, for example, the court must determine whether the 
competitive harm from a particular rule, such as limiting teams to four 
nationally televised games per year, is justified by some offsetting 
benefit.  Because of limitations in our fact finding ability we try to do 
 
95Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 13 (1984) (criticizing courts that “see only the gross 
effects—averages rather than the margins on which people are 
trading”).  See also id. at 33: 
The Court's efforts to influence future conduct are doomed 
unless it appreciates how incentives work…. [P]eople look at 
marginal rather than average effects. They substitute among 
opportunities until they receive approximately the same 
reward from each of their activities (whether buying or 
doing). They buy or do a little more of one thing and a little 
less of something else until it is not worthwhile to make 
further changes. At that point the marginal gains of each 
activity are approximately the same. Change the returns of the 
margin and people alter their behavior; change the returns 
somewhere inside the margin and people are unlikely to alter 
their behavior in the desired way—if at all. 
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this without “balancing,”96 but the all important thing is that we are 
looking at incremental harms and benefits.  For example, the important 
antitrust question in the NCAA case is not whether the NCAA as an 
institution is so competitively harmful that it must be dissolved.  That 
might be the question in a per se challenge to a cartel.   Neither can we 
say, however, that because the NCAA is a good thing its rule limiting 
the output of televised games is just fine.  One must gauge the marginal 
effects of the challenged rule against any benefits offered for it.  The 
burden-shifting framework developed for the rule of reason is an effort 
to conduct this cost-benefit analysis. 
The AmEx majority lost sight of the fact that effects at the 
margin are what counts. This would involve, first, assessing the 
marginal harms to competition caused by the anti-steering rule; and 
then looking for offsetting benefits from that rule that might serve to 
justify it.  What marginalist analysis does not do is look at the entire 
enterprise or business model, proclaim it a good thing, and be done. 
The AmEx majority wrote: 
Amex’s higher merchant fees are based on a careful 
study of how much additional value its cardholders 
offer merchants ….On the other side of the market, 
Amex uses its higher merchant fees to offer its 
cardholders a more robust rewards program, which is 
necessary to maintain cardholder loyalty and encourage 
the level of spending that makes Amex valuable to 
merchants ….That Amex allocates prices between 
merchants and cardholders differently from Visa and 
MasterCard is simply not evidence that it wields market 
power to achieve anticompetitive ends.97 
However, the challenge in this case was not to AmEx’s overall 
business model, which we can presume offered cardholders in the 
aggregate overall value in excess of overall costs. For example, in the 
 
96See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶1507 (4th ed. 2018). 
97 AmEx, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2288 (2018) (citations omitted). 
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NCAA case, the challenge was not to the existence or legitimacy of the 
NCAA as an association, which no one was challenging. Rather, it was 
to the effect of a limitation on each member team’s televised games.98 
By the same token, the question in AmEx was not whether AmEx’s 
business model requiring higher fees in exchange for larger cardholder 
benefits was anticompetitive. Rather, it was whether the anti-steering 
rule produced incremental harms to competition that were greater than 
incremental benefits.  The people affected by steering would be those 
marginal customers who would have accepted a steering offer had it 
been made, as well as those merchants who would have profited by 
incentivizing a customer to switch to a lower price card. 
The Second Circuit had also confused the question of total versus 
marginal effects by stating that 
[b]ecause the NDPs99 affect competition for 
cardholders as well as merchants, the Plaintiffs’ 
initial burden was to show that the NDPs made 
all Amex consumers on both sides of the 
platform—i.e., both merchants and 
cardholders—worse off overall.100 
But “all customers” is clearly wrong.  As with any restraint, many 
customers were not affected at all. For example, the restraint on game 
televising in the NCAA case did not affect those who did not watch 
televised games at all. Rules imposing resale price maintenance affect 
only discounters that would otherwise charge a lower price. Standard 
setting and other boycott rules affect only producers at risk of violating 
 
98NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). See 7 AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note __, ¶¶1502–1504, 1511. 
99The Second Circuit used the term “nondiscriminatory provisions,” or 
NDPs to describe AmEx’s policies “barring merchants from (1) 
offering customers any discounts or nonmonetary incentives to use 
credit cards less costly for merchants to accept, (2) expressing 
preferences for any card, or (3) disclosing information about the costs 
of different cards to merchants who accept them.” AmEx., 838 F.3d 
179, 184 (2d Cir. 2016). 
100 Id. at 205 (italics in original). 
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a standard.101  The marginal cardholders in the AmEx case were those 
who would have switched in response to a steering offer because they 
valued the switch by more than the foregone AmEx perks. 
When the government is seeking an injunction against a practice 
rather than complete destruction of the defendant’s business method, 
then the issue is limited to the competitive effect of that particular rule. 
Here, the affected customers were those that would have switched to a 
less costly card but for the anti-steering rule. The value that they placed 
on the defendant’s perks was less than the incremental price to 
merchants of using the AmEx card.102 
As the district court observed, other AmEx cardholders would 
decline the merchant’s offer to switch, because for them the value of 
the perks were at least as high as the merchant’s acceptance fee, or at 
least as high as that portion of the fee that the merchant offered them 
for switching.103 Of course, these cardholders were unaffected by the 
anti-steering rule. Cardholders whose behavior was actually changed 
by the rule were worse off, thus creating lost value on both sides of the 
platform. 
Even if the market were defined as including both sides, the way 
the majority defined it, competitive harm was apparent: at the margin, 
cardholders, merchants, and the rival platform were all injured by an 
output-reducing restraint. 
The only beneficiary of the anti-steering rule was AmEx.  It was 
able to preserve transactions to itself at a price clearly in excess of the 
value that the affected cardholders placed on use of the card.104  By 
contrast, a cardholder switch to Visa would produce both higher 
cardholder and merchant value, as well as higher output in the product 
market.  One fact finding that the Supreme Court did not disturb was 
that merchants passed on AmEx’s higher fees through higher product 
prices across the board.  Because merchants could not price 
discriminate between customers who used an AmEx card and those 
 
101See 13 PHILLIP E AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,  ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶2231 (4th ed. 2019). 
102See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
103United States v. American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 220 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
104See E. Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, supra. 
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that used a cheaper card, these higher prices affected even people who 
did not use the AmEx card at all.105 To be sure, the loss of these 
transactions would cost AmEx revenue, but that is simply the result of 
competition. 
Under steering, cardholders and customers could negotiate to their 
joint maximizing position. Consumers who placed a small value on 
AmEx’s benefits could use a cheaper card. For their part, merchants 
could bargain by discounting the price, or offering collateral services, 
such as free delivery, to reflect the merchant costs of a particular 
payment form. The important thing is that everything would be 
discounted into the purchase price. One important principle is that 
payment systems should be “neutral” and transparent, permitting the 
parties to negotiate to a mutually beneficial maximum.106  In the 
 
105 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F.Supp.3d 143, 208 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d on other grounds, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 
2016), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 
(2018) (“inflated merchant discount rates are passed on to all 
customers—Amex cardholders and non-cardholders alike—in the 
form of higher retail prices”); id. at 215-218. 
106See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A 
Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645, 649 (2006): 
Neutrality in payment systems. The choice 
of an interchange fee paid by the merchant’s 
bank, the acquirer, to the cardholder’s bank, the 
issuer, is irrelevant if the following conditions 
are jointly satisfied: First, issuers and acquirers 
pass through the corresponding charge (or 
benefit) to the cardholder and the merchant. 
Second, the merchant can charge two different 
prices for goods or services depending on 
whether the consumer pays by cash or by card; 
in other words, the payment system does not 
impose a no-surcharge rule as a condition for 
the merchant to be affiliated with the system. 
Third, the merchant and the consumer incur no 
transaction cost associated with a dual price 
system. 
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process of injuring its own card holders, AMeX’s anti-steering rule 
also excluded rival card platforms that were ready to offer better terms. 
Competition and “Welcome Acceptance” 
One of the most fundamental principles of economics is that 
market participants including consumers are rational actors, which 
means that they maximize within the array of choices that they are 
presented.107  Given appropriate information they will make decisions 
that maximize their own value.  In defending the anti-steering rule, the 
Court concluded that for a dealer to offer a customer a discount for 
purchasing with an alternative card “undermines the cardholder’s 
expectation of ‘welcome acceptance’—the promise of a frictionless 
transaction.”108 “A lack of welcome acceptance at one merchant makes 
a cardholder less likely to use Amex at all other merchants.”109 The 
Court described this lack of welcome acceptance as an “externality” 
that “endangers the viability of the entire Am[E]x network….”110 
 It would be hard to come up with a more anti-market rationale than 
this one.  Providing a customer with truthful information about the 
availability of a cheaper alternative is neither an externality nor an 
affront to consumer rationality.  It is in fact fundamental to the 
workings of competitive markets.  To be sure, informing a customer 
that an available alternative B is cheaper than alternative A might 
hinder the customer’s “welcome acceptance” of A.  That is actually 
the way that competition works. 
The “welcome acceptance” argument is impossible to harmonize 
with the premise that consumers make choices in a way that maximizes 
their own welfare. “Welcome acceptance” in this case apparently 
 
As Rochet and Tirole observe, in a properly functioning market 
merchants and customers would move to a wealth-maximizing 
equilibrium. But the minimum conditions are that the parties are free 
to bargain (i.e., there is no prohibition on steering) and that they have 
adequate information about the gains that would be available from 
trading. Id. at 649. 
107See, e.g.,  WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, 
MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES & POLICY 85-98 (12th ed. 2012). 
108AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2289 (citing 88 F. Supp. 3d at 156). 
109Ibid. 
110Ibid. 
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meant that the buyer should be prevented from even knowing that a 
cheaper alternative was available. The Second Circuit had decided that 
permitting consumers to make informed choices about options was 
generally desirable but that “welcome acceptance” could be a viable 
defense on a credit card platform because loss of a sale via steering 
could have a negative impact on both sides.111 
Certainly, loss of “welcome acceptance” on one product could 
undermine a firm’s business model by impairing earnings elsewhere.  
For example, a consumer induced to buy an electric automobile after 
a dealer’s comparisons of gasoline and electric vehicles might 
certainly have an impact on the market for gasoline.  The Court seemed 
to think that interfering with a consumer choice in a primary good was 
a bad thing if it had an impact on some secondary good.   By contrast, 
the district court took the economically rational view of the situation 
that “[a]llowing merchants to actively participate in their customers’ 
point-of-sale decisions would remove the artificial barrier that now 
segregates merchant demand from the price of network services 
….”112 
* * * * * 
Do Apple and AmEx signal a new direction among the majority 
of the Supreme Court, in which fidelity to fundamental economics is 
no longer important?  It may be too early to say, but these two opinions 
are not very encouraging.  The Supreme Court in the 1960s was 
rightfully accused of torturing the economics to any degree necessary 
to achieve a preconceived outcome.  Today it seems to be doing a 
different version of the same thing, but that is not the way that good 
antitrust economics is supposed to work.113 
 
111See 838 F.3d at 191: “Although merchants across various industries 
regularly try to “steer” their customers toward certain purchasing 
decisions via strategic product placement, discounts, and other deals, 
steering within the credit-card industry can be harmful insofar as it 
interferes with a network’s ability to balance its two-sided net price.” 
112AmEx, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 220–21. 
113See Herbert Hovenkamp and Fiona M. Scott Morton, Framing the 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, __ UNIV. PENN. L. REV. ___ 
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ANTITRUST AND THE PROGRESSIVE WING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 
Antitrust policy’s leftward tail, made plain in statements by 
some 2020 Democratic Presidential candidates, also suffers from 
deficiencies in economic reasoning, although very different ones.  In 
their favor, they do a much better job than the right does of 
acknowledging that the United States is experiencing a monopoly 
problem, reflected in unreasonably high price-cost margins, a 
declining share of labor participation, and higher concentration.114 
They are also correct to think that antitrust policy needs a serious new 
look, and that the issues it presents are worthy ones in a presidential 
campaign.  However, some of the proposed solutions are policy 
misfires, likely to make the problem worse rather than better. 
Mergers and Consumer Welfare 
Presidential candidate Senator Amy Klobuchar and former 
candidates Kirsten Gillibrand and Cory Booker have proposed merger 
legislation115 that is focused far too much on increased concentration 
 
(2020), currently available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3481388. 
114See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose, Concerns About Concentration (Aspen 
Institute, 2019), available at https://economicstrategygroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/Maintaining-the-Strength-of-American-
Capialism-Concerns-About-Concentration.pdf (summarizing 
economic data and conclusions).  See also Bridgewater Assocs., Peak 
Profit Margins? A U.S. Perspective (Feb. 7, 2019), available at 
https://www.bridgewater.com/research-library/daily-
observations/peak-profit-margins-a-us-perspective/peak-profit-
margins-a-us-perspective.pdf. 
115Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2019, 
S. 307, 116th Cong. (2017), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/307/text.  
The Bill is co-sponsored by Senators Edward J. Markey, Richard 
Blumenthal, Cory Booker, and Kirsten Gillibrand 
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for its own sake, and too little on the threat of higher prices.116  Indeed, 
one portion of the bill would pursue mergers of very large firms simply 
because they are large, regardless of concentration or predicted impact 
on prices, and even if the firms are not competitors.117 
 
116For a fuller analysis of the bill, See Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl 
Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 
127 YALE L. J. 1996 (2018). 
117Consolidation Prevention Act, supra, note __: 
 
§3.  Unlawful Acquisitions 
 In a case brought by the United States, the Federal Trade 
Commission, or a State attorney general, a court shall determine 
that the effect of an acquisition described in this section may be 
materially to lessen competition or create a monopoly or a 
monopsony if—… 
“(B) (i) as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person 
would hold an aggregate total amount of the voting securities 
and assets of the acquired person in excess of $5,000,000,000 
(as adjusted and published for each fiscal year beginning after 
September 30, 2020, in the same manner as provided in section 
8(a)(5) to reflect the percentage change in the gross national 
product for such fiscal year compared to the gross national 
product for the year ending September 30, 2019); or 
“(ii) (I) the person acquiring or the person being acquired 
has assets, net annual sales, or a market capitalization greater 
than $100,000,000,000 (as so adjusted and published); and 
“(II) as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person 
would hold an aggregate total amount of the voting securities 
and assets of the acquired person in excess of $50,000,000 (as 
so adjusted and published)…. 
Id. at 2023. 
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Such a bill needs a coherent theory of economic harm, or else 
explicit recognition that it is giving up on an economic approach to 
merger law altogether. On the one hand, the link between 
concentration and high margins is provable and proven.  The link 
between absolute size and prices is not proven.  The economic basis 
for pursuing pure conglomerate mergers is weak, but in any event a 
basis is not articulated in this Bill.118 
One problem with the theories under which conglomerate 
mergers were condemned in the past is that they involved mainly 
mergers of complementary products. Such mergers can definitely 
create advantages over rivals.  Just as vertical mergers, they eliminate 
the need for market transactions and much of the coordination that use 
of the market entails.  What they need at this stage, however, is some 
theory such as that developed in the draft Vertical Merger Guidelines 
(2020)119 to explain when such mergers can result in reduced output 
and higher prices. Otherwise they should be more candid in admitting 
that protection of consumers is not the rationale.  The first and most 
 
118One possibility is “portfolio theory,” accepted in one case by the 
European Commission but not in the United States.  See Case No. 
Comp/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell (July 3, 2001) 
[hereinafter GE/Honeywell], at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m222
0_en.pdf.  See Gotz Drauz, Unbundling GE/Honeywell: The 
Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers Under EC Competition Law, 
25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 885 (2002).  For a less favorable assessment, 
see Eric S. Hochstadt, The Brown Shoe of European Union 
Competition Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 287 (2002).  Another 
possibility is some variation of the “potential competition” doctrines, 
which do not reach all conglomerates but only those that eliminate 
the opportunities for potential competition.  In any event, those 
theories have not been applied in the United States for decades.  See 
V PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶¶1121-1135 (4th ed. 2017) (assessing the “perceived potential 
entrant” doctrine and the “actual potential entrant” doctrine). 
119Note __, supra. 
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obvious consequence of mergers of complements is better 
coordination and reduced costs, and thus benefits to consumers. 
Such mergers were occasionally condemned in the 1960s.  One 
example was Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated 
Industries, Inc.,120 which condemned the merger of a firm that made 
steel rolling mills and a firm that made the electric wiring installations 
for such mills.  These were product complements.  A complete 
installation required one mill plus one wiring harness.  The court 
offered the theory that the merger would create “the only company 
capable of designing, producing and installing a complete metal rolling 
mill,” and this “would raise higher the already significant barriers to 
the entry of others.”121 
Segregating Platform Sales 
Senator Elizabeth Warren’s antitrust policy has focused less on 
mergers and more on dominant firms – in particular, the large digital 
platforms.  She proposes that large internet sellers such as Amazon be 
prevented from selling both their own products and those of competing 
sellers on the same platform.122  It is hard to believe that much thought 
was given to considering the impact of such a policy on competition 
or – for that matter – even to identifying who is injured when a firm 
such as Amazon sells both its own house brands and the brands of 
rivals in close comparison on the same site. 
Many of the brands that compete with Amazon’s own brands 
are sold by large firms, and often at margins that are significantly 
higher than Amazon’s margins. For example, Amazon sells its own 
AmazonBasics batteries in competition with brands that include 
 
120414 F.2d 506, 517-18 (3d Cir. 1969). 
121Id. at 517-518.  The GE-Honeywell decision, supra note __, in the 
EU was somewhat similar. 
122See Elizabeth Warren, It’s Time to Break up Amazon, Google, and 
Facebook (March 8, 2019), available at 
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-
tech-9ad9e0da324c. 
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Delco, Duracell, Energizer, and Rayovac.  It sells AmazonBasics 
toasters in competition with Black & Decker, Hamilton Beach, and 
KitchenAid (owned by Whirlpool).  It sells AmazonBasics plastic 
storage containers in competition with brands that include 
Rubbermaid, Glad, and Anchor Hocking; and AmazonBasics office 
supplies sell in competition with 3M Corp., whose competing products 
include Scotch Tape and Post-It notes. 
Forcibly separating Amazon’s brands from the offerings of 
these companies will almost certainly reduce downward pricing 
pressure on these national name brands, resulting in higher prices for 
consumers.  Few small firms will be benefitted.  Most of the benefits 
will accrue to companies like 3M (the largest maker of office supplies 
in the United States); Berkshire Hathaway (who owns Duracell); Black 
& Decker (America’s largest manufacturer of small appliances and 
power tools); or Samsonite (the world’s largest luggage manufacturer, 
which competes with AmazonBasics luggage). 
At the same time, under the Warren proposal Amazon could 
sell AmazonBasics or its other store brands only on a separate website.  
If it chose to do so, there would of course be less competitive pressure 
on their prices as well.  As a result, prices on both the third party 
website and the Amazon products website would rise.  Of course, each 
platform would be smaller to the extent that it did not carry the 
products on the other platform. 
I doubt very much that Senator Warren is consciously pursuing 
a policy of enriching Berkshire-Hathaway, 3M, or Black & Decker at 
the expense of consumers.  More likely, I suspect, her advisors were 
so fixated on the rhetoric of bigness that they never sat down to figure 
out who was getting harmed or benefitted by this proposal. 
To be sure, some small sellers would fare better if Amazon’s 
website did not offer their goods in competition with Amazon brands. 
Senator Warren’s proposal includes as an example, a laptop computer 
stand sold on Amazon by Rain Design, a relatively small firm, at a 
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price that hovers between $40 and $43.123  Amazon has its own, 
somewhat different rival stand at about half that price, $19.99.124  
Several other companies offer similar stands on Amazon, most of them 
cheaper than the Rain Design stand.  A search for “adjustable laptop 
stand” reveals more than twenty similar although distinguishable 
products ranging in price from roughly $19 to roughly $45.  Rain 
Design is near the top of that range and the Amazon product near the 
bottom.  While the products perform the same general function, they 
are differentiated, which means that different customers might value 
one over the other. 
Several things are wrong with Senator Warren’s proposal.  
First, there is no evidence indicating whether the most likely 
competitors of Amazon’s store brands are small firms like Rain 
Design, or much larger firms such as 3M,  Berkshire-Hathaway, or 
Samsonite.  There does not appear to be a good study of the issue.  
However, basic economics suggests that Amazon will introduce its 
own house brands in areas that offer promising entry opportunities.  
These would be markets characterized by a large sales volume and 
high margins in relation to the entry investment. The promise of high 
volume and a high markup on existing products are common 
inducements to entry.  Further, the market for household batteries or 
consumer luggage is undoubtedly many times larger than the market 
for laptop stands. 
 
123See Spencer Soper, Got a Hot Seller on Amazon? Prepare for E-
Tailer to Make One Too (Apr. 20, 2016), available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-20/got-a-hot-
seller-on-amazon-prepare-for-e-tailer-to-make-one-too.  
124See https://smile.amazon.com/Rain-Design-mStand-Laptop-
Patented/dp/B000OOYECC/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=rain+design+lapt
op+stand&qid=1577046924&sr=8-1 (Rain Design stand); and 
https://smile.amazon.com/AmazonBasics-DSN-01750-SL-Laptop-
Stand-
Silver/dp/B00WRDS0AU/ref=sr_1_11?keywords=rain+design+lapto
p+stand&qid=1577047065&sr=8-11 (AmazonBasics stand). 
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Second, no claim is made that the AmazonBasics’ laptop stand 
infringes a utility patent, a design patent, or any other intellectual 
property right owned by Rain Design.125  Before we can declare as 
“unfair” one firm’s design of a lower cost (or lower margin) product 
we must have some criterion of fairness.126  In this case, protecting 
consumers from high prices does not appear to be one of them, but 
protecting a seller’s high margins from rivals willing to sell a non-
infringing product for less apparently is. 
A third point is critical: suppose we enacted the Warren 
proposal and forced Amazon to drop either the Rain Design stand or 
the AmazonBasics stand from its website.  Amazon would almost 
certainly dump Rain Design.  The principal impact would be that Rain 
Design could no longer sell its stand on the Amazon website.  No one 
seems to have thought about that.  Indeed, it replays an error that 
antitrust well wishers have committed time and time again.  In an effort 
to protect small businesses, the courts fashioned harsh rules 
condemning such practices as exclusive dealing127 or maximum resale 
 
125The Amazon entry for the Rain Design stand indicates that it is 
patented but does not claim infringement against Amazon.  However, 
Rain Design has sued another firm for trademark, trade dress, 
copyright, and patent infringement of a product identified as a laptop 
stand.  See Rain Design, Inc. v. Spinido, Inc., 2018 WL 4904894 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2018) (dismissing complaint on jurisdictional 
grounds).  For more details, see Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Default Judgment, Rain Design, 
Inc. v. Spinido, Inc., 2018 WL 7138290 (N.D.Cal.  Sep. 6, 2018). 
126 Cf. the well known Supreme Court decision in Fashion Originators 
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (condemning effort by 
fashion manufacturers to create their own intellectual property system 
and enforce it via store boycotts). 
127See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. V. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 316 
(1949) (condemning exclusive dealing under an aggressive standard 
over Justice Douglas’ objection that it would force refiners to build 
their own gasoline stations and cease dealing with independents).  See 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of vertical Integration and the Business 
Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA L. REV. 863, 884 (2010).  
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price maintenance128 where no injury to competition was in sight.  The 
effect of these antitrust rules was to make dealing with independent 
small firms so costly that the larger businesses opted instead not to deal 
with them at all.  The result was to make life even more difficult for 
the small businesses that the courts intended to protect. 
Amazon’s practice of selling both its own products and those 
of rivals in close juxtaposition will almost certainly benefit consumers 
by permitting close price comparisons.  When Amazon introduces a 
product such as AmazonBasics alkaline batteries in competition with 
Duracell, prices will go down.  There is no evidence to suggest that the 
practice is so prone to abuse or so likely to harm consumers in other 
ways that it should be categorically condemned.   Rather it is an act of 
partial vertical integration similar to other practices that the antitrust 
laws have confronted in the past.  One close analogy is dual 
distribution, which occurs when a firm sells through both independent 
franchisees and its wholly owned stores.129  Such practices nearly 
always increase output, benefitting consumers and typically even 
independent competing firms. 
An important lesson from the history of antitrust enforcement 
is that one must always consider how a firm will respond to an antitrust 
injunction.  For example, telling a firm such as Amazon that it may no 
longer sell its own AmazonBasics toaster on its website in competition 
with toasters made by Cuisinart, Black & Decker, or Sunbeam requires 
Amazon to choose among several options:  (1) it might produce a 
second website, offering its own products on one and products sold by 
third party vendors on the other;  (2)  it might exit from the market for 
 
128Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (condemning 
newspaper’s limits on prices charged by delivery agents).  See 
Hovenkamp, Law of Vertical Integration, supra note __ at 907 
(“Albrecht virtually guaranteed that large numbers of manufacturers 
would simply stop using independent dealer networks and switch to 
ownership vertical integration”). 
129See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note __, 
§11.6e. 
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its own brands and sell only the brands of other firms; (3) it might do 
just the opposite, terminating its sales arrangements with third-party 
firms and selling only its house brands.  Amazon would take the most 
profitable course.  Option (1) would benefit the outside sellers because 
they would no longer have to compete with Amazon on the same 
website.  Option (2) would also clearly benefit the outside sellers 
because they would not have to compete with Amazon at all.  Option 
(3) would harm the outside sellers because they could no longer sell 
on any Amazon website. None of these options benefits consumers.  
Output is likely to go down and prices up under all of them, for each 
reduces the amount of competition between Amazon and outside 
vendors. 
Antitrust under the consumer welfare standard would find all 
of these options, if forced by a court decree, unacceptable.  Prices 
would be higher under all of them.  Under a different standard, such as 
protecting third party businesses, different outcomes would affect 
them in different ways.  Here, it is important to keep in mind that most 
of these businesses are not small, although they are smaller than 
Amazon.  Second, we would not know how they would be affected 
unless we could predict which of these options Amazon would 
choose.130  That is very a likely a problem in predicting Amazon’s 
profit-maximizing option or options.  For that, economics would be 
essential no matter what our underlying goal. 
Finally, while no case can be made for structural separation of 
inside and outside sales, agreements that involve third party vendors 
are still subject to §1 of the Sherman Act and, in some cases, §§3 and 
7 of the Clayton Act.  Here the antitrust laws can exercise essential 
control, and practices such as exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, or 
MFNs are remediable, as are anticompetitive acquisitions.  The result 
 
130 For a discussion of various options, see Patrick F. Todd, Digital 
Platforms and the Leverage Problem, 98 Neb. L. Rev. 586 (2019). 
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in nearly all cases finding an antitrust violation would be an injunction. 
These solutions are less dramatic but likely to be much more effective. 
CONCLUSION 
To circle back to the main point, when used correctly and 
without excessive ideology, economics is a powerful, neutral tool for 
helping people identify injuries to competition and appropriate fixes. 
Indeed, that is the first and best use of antitrust economics. It does not 
always require difficult mathematics or highly technical analysis, but 
sometimes just informed common sense about how markets work and 
who is affected by policy changes.  Both of the sides described above 
have ignored the first rule of rational antitrust policy: figure out who 
is getting hurt, and how. 
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions in Apple vs. 
Pepper paid much attention to the question of who is harmed as an 
injury is passed along from a cartel or monopolist to its successive 
purchasers.  The majority in AmEx seemed so taken with two-sided 
markets, the latest shiny object among market theories, that they did 
not do serious market analysis in order to assess harms and benefits.  
The progressive proposals for mergers and platform separation do no 
better.  Proposals like the one calling for the separation of platforms 
and third party markets seem calculated to harm precisely the people 
they are intended to benefit. 
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